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SUMMARY
The ratio shown in Figure S -2 suggests that the Army has become more efficient over the past 39 years in producing combat potential. In the Vietnam War, it took about 3,500 personnel to support one combat battalion. In the post-Vietnam drawdown, the Army was able to support one combat battalion with 2,500 personnel. During the Cold War buildup, it took about 3,000 personnel to support a combat battalion, but for the past decade the Army has been able to support a combat battalion with about 2,500 personnel.
There is no indication that the Army has become less efficient or burdened by excessive overhead. 
INTRODUCTION
In discussing the evolution of the Army's combat potential from FY1962 through FY2000, this paper-
• Traces the variation in the number and mix of Army combat battalions since FY1962.
• Shows how the Army force structure has changed over the past 39 years to meet the needs of the Nation.
• Uses the aggregate number of combat battalions as a rough output measure to indicate the trend in the Army's overall combat-to-support ratio.
This paper incorporates three terms that need to be defined at the outset. 1
• A military force is "any body of persons that combines for the purpose of waging or threatening to wage aggressive or defensive military conflict with respect to any other body of persons."
• Combat potential is the "pre-combat latent designed capacity of a [military] force to achieve useful results in combat." Combat potential is converted into combat power when combat starts. Combat potential is the measure (or descriptor) adopted in this paper to express the capability of the Army's force structure.
• Combat battalions interact by design with the enemy either in direct contact or by application of firepower while not in direct contact. 2 The aggregate number of combat battalions describes the combat potential of a military force. 
Combat Battalions
The Army subdivides the army-in-the-field into three general categories of units:
combat, combat support, and combat service support. Combat battalions provide greater granularity and precision in describing land combat potential than can be achieved by using larger formations. Divisions, brigades, and brigade task forces are large combined arms formations that include a variable mix and number of combat units, as well as combat support and combat service support units.
The composition of divisions and brigades has varied significantly over time, and at any one time there are several different sizes and shapes of these organizations in the force structure. Using the number of divisions or brigades to describe land combat potential is convenient but conveys an inaccurate and imprecise impression. Addressing land combat potential in terms of combat battalions provides a better basis for analysis than using larger organizations for this purpose.
Although providing more precision than brigades and divisions, battalions and companies also come in a wide variety of sizes and shapes. They have changed composition over the years, and there may be several versions in the force structure at any one time. Aggregating the number of tank battalions, for example, introduces an error if the battalions are equipped with different models of tanks. A tank battalion with 78 MIA1 tanks has a different combat potential than a tank battalion with 54 M60A1 tanks. These errors can be reduced by making allowances for difference by weighting the various specific unit types according to their contribution to overall combat potential. Doing this, however, requires knowledge of the primary characteristics of each specific type of combat battalion, and that has not been attempted in this paper.
The aggregation of all kinds of combat battalions to achieve a single number that purports to represent the combat potential of a force or of a force structure is fraught with peril. However, it is better than simply counting brigades and divisions.
Methodology
The data for the period FY1962-FY2000 are from the Forces File of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 3 They are the official numbers of combat and combat support battalions and separate companies in the Army force structure at the end of fiscal years as reported by the Army. The basic data are arrayed by component (Active, National Guard, Army Reserve) and resource identification code (RIC), which identifies the specific type of unit.
The table of combat battalions was prepared in the following manner. Each entry in the database represents a unit type identified by a RIC and grouped by component. The first step was to sort the data by RIC into group-like units. The second step was to aggregate each unit type by component. The third step was to delete the units that were not combat battalions or separate companies. The fourth step was to compute battalion equivalents by summing separate companies of a type (or a set of types) and dividing by 4 three. The fifth and final step was to aggregate battalions and battalion equivalents into major categories of combat battalions to provide time series data. A table of the basic data used to construct the charts in this paper is appended.
FYDP data were available for FY1962 to FY2000. Annual force structure data from FY1945 to FY1961 have not yet been found. The number and mix of combat battalions has been estimated for the maximum strengths for World War II and (with considerable difficulty) the Korean War. Attempts will be made to locate battalion-level troop lists for the period FY1945 to FY1961.
The FYDP Forces File contains some inconsistencies that may or may not be errors. These inconsistencies may stem in part from changes over the years in the Army's method of accounting for units and in part from differences between programmed and actual forces that have not been reconciled. For this reason, the appended table of basic data needs to be reviewed by the Army to ensure that it is a correct historical record.
Some of the areas of concern are as follows.
The mix of infantry battalions is confusing during the last 10 years of the Forces 
ANALYSIS
The combat battalion data have been arrayed in different ways to illustrate various characteristics of the force structure. Several charts follow, accompanied by commentary. The Army raised for World War II was the largest aggregation of land combat potential in this century. It was predominantly infantry, but there were also numerous tank battalions and a large number of artillery battalions. These data, derived from the Official History, include the National Guard and Army Reserve (both on active duty for the war), and the Army of the United States (AUS). To make the ratio comparable with the ratios for later wars, the number of combat battalions for the Vietnam War has been increased by 24 special operations battalions, based on 8 special forces groups, each credited with 3 battalion equivalents. The personnel to combat battalion ratio for the Army at the end of FY2000 is consistent with the experience of the 1990s and represents a decrease of almost 1,800 from the ratio experienced in World War II. Maneuver battalions are the infantry and tank battalions that move tactically on the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy. Figure 9 shows the relative contribution of the Army's three components to the total number of maneuver battalions.
During the entire period, about half of the total battalions were available in the Active Army. From FY1964 to FY1994 the Army Reserve contributed few maneuver battalions.
Active maneuver battalions were increased substantially for the Vietnam War and reduced sharply after that war was concluded. The Active Army remained steady after that until the post-Cold War drawdown to the Base Force. Guard maneuver battalions were increased during the 1980s defense buildup. After the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, the number of maneuver battalions was reduced significantly to levels that were about the same as existed in FY1962, except that the number of Active Army maneuver battalions is somewhat lower than in FY1962. The total number of maneuver battalions (including Guard and Reserve battalions) shown in Figure 11 shows the same trend toward half-heavy and half-light that was evident in Figure 10 . Medium battalions remained longer in the Guard than in the Active Army, but in the late 1990s all were converted to light (air assault) battalions to save manpower spaces. Because the National Guard is a heavier force, the Total Army mix at the end of FY2000 is about 40% light and 60% heavy. • During the first 30 of the past 39 years, the Army's combat potential as described by the aggregate number of combat battalions was maintained at a high level to deal with the threat of the Soviet Union, and even more combat potential was added to deal with the Vietnam War and the final phase of the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the army's combat potential has declined to about two-thirds of its high values during the Vietnam War and the final phase of the Cold War.
• Whether by design or instinct, the mix of combat battalions in the Army's force structure has been remarkably consistent over four decades despite major fluctuations in strength and the introduction of new weapons and new doctrine. This is either a good thing because it recognizes the enduring basic nature of land combat or a bad thing because it reflects organizational inertia carried to an extreme.
• The aggregate number of combat battalions is a useful description of the combat potential of a force structure or a force within that force structure.
• The use of the aggregate number of combat battalions as a measure of combat potential does not take into account variations of the battalions among types and, within a type, variations in output.
• The combat battalion database could be extended to the next level of detail to account for differences within a single unit type.
• The ratio of total personnel to the aggregate number of combat battalions over the period from FY1962 to FY2000 does not reveal any discontinuities or adverse trends that would substantiate a hypothesis that the Army is becoming inefficient from having excessive overhead. The ratio does suggest that the Army has become more efficient in recent years in extracting combat potential from its military members and civilian workforce.
